An extended small open economy model is developed and used to examine the effect of trade on the illicit expropriation of incomes and the provision of legal services. We derive conditions under which trade liberalization will reduce expropriation activities. We also derive sufficient conditions for the gains from trade to be amplified or muted relative to the standard model. The signs of these effects depend on factor intensity rankings and factor abundance ratios. Thus the results show that trade liberalization will be beneficial to countries that export labor intensive goods by reducing the incentives for illicit expropriation and reducing the costs of providing legal services. The model also shows that trade liberalization can increase expropriation, particularly for countries that import labor intensive goods and have labor intensive crime problems.
Introduction
There is considerable empirical support for the idea that economic prosperity depends on institutions to secure property rights. Examples include Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Rodrik (1999) , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) , Dollar and Kraay (2003) , Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) and Levine (2005) .
1 Nevertheless, as stated by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) , we remain far from having a useful framework for understanding how economic institutions are determined and why they vary across countries.
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The aim of this paper is to consider how international trade affects the security of property rights and predatory activities (expropriation) and how these affect the gains from trade. It is recognized that international trade can affect the incentives to engage in unproductive activities and also affect the cost of providing institutions to protect property rights.
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We extend this literature by incorporating expropriation of incomes and law enforcement activities into a general equilibrium model. In this model, factor endowments, technology and world prices determine not only factor returns and output levels, but also the level of expropriation and the provision of legal services. The model is used to describe the relationship between trade liberalization, the level of expropriation in the economy and the gains from trade. One interpretation of our results, for example, is that, if crime is a labor intensive activity, trade liberalization can increase crime in developed countries but reduce crime in developing countries.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the related literature on trade and predation. In Section 3 we describe a simplified model in which predation occurs but the level of law enforcement supplied is fixed. Preliminary results, presented in Section 4, derive the necessary restrictions on factor proportions and intensities of factor 1 This literature builds upon pioneering studies such as North and Weingast (1989) , Engerman (1973) . 2 Likewise Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (2004) and Rodrik (2008) have highlighted the complexity of defining institutions and understanding interactions between institutional reform and economic prosperity.
3 For example see Holmes and Schmitz Jr (2001) regarding unproductive activities and Clarida and Findlay (2003) regarding trade and institutions.
use in expropriation that must hold for falling trade costs to reduce predation. Section 5 introduces the full model with endogenous law enforcement services and presents the main comparative static results. The gains from trade propositions are presented in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
Background
Models of incomplete property rights have been used extensively in the economics of crime literature that followed Becker (1968) , and in the conflict literature following early studies by Boulding (1988) and Hirshleifer (1988) .
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As noted by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) , however, there are few formal models that attempt to explain the interaction between international trade and property rights. To this end Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) incorporate endogenous conflict into a Ricardian trade model model to see how the gains from trade are affected by the need for investment military institutions (guns).
Likewise Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) and Anderson and Bandiera (2006) use Ricardian models, with the addition of potential piracy, to demonstrate how institutions may promote trade.
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We extend this literature by considering how international trade affects the protection of private property in a small open economy. Thus, as opposed to international conflict over common resources or piracy, we consider what Acemoglu (2006) describes as "simple violations of property rights". Examples include the illicit removal of land tenure, expropriation of assets, a failure to pay wages and various forms of coercion. In what follows we refer to these all such violations simply as "expropriation". We also extend the literature by incorporating expropriation into a factor proportions framework. The generalization to more than one factor is important since, empirically, expropriation is related to differences in relative incomes.
6
Investigating the causes of expropriation is an important economic issue since expropriation imposes significant economic costs. For instance Kaufmann, Kraay and ZoidoLobatn (1999) note the economic costs of governance indicators (including corruption and perceptions of crime) on income levels.
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Likewise the ILO (2005) stress the wide prevalence of coercion and forms of servitude, and Collier and Gunning (1999) highlight the economic costs of armed civil conflict.
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In addition to these direct costs of expropriation, the cost of maintaining adequate legal services is a significant economic constraint in newly developing economies such as India and China.
9
The role of international trade in impeding or facilitating expropriation is, however, the subject of an enduring debate.
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The potential costs of trade liberalization, in terms of inequality and crime, have been emphasized by Stiglitz (2002) and Wade (2004) . Likewise rising social conflict has been attributed to trade liberalization episodes in several countries. For example Keen (2005) discusses the case of Sierra Leone, Deraniyagala (2005) discusses Nepal, and Brysk and Wise (1997) discuss some examples of rising social conflict Latin America countries.
In contrast Collier and Gunning (1999) and Collier and Hoffler (2002) note the beneficial effects of openness on crime and civil conflict in African countries. Other relevant evidence includes the escalation of crime that occurred in Yugoslavia in 1992 following trade sanctions, and the rise in crime in Columbia following negative terms-of-trade shocks.
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6 See for example Soares (2004) . The factor proportions approach also helps us relate our results to the extensive literature on trade and wages. As noted by Krugman (2008) the factor proportions setting remains the most useful model for thinking about trade and factor incomes issues.
7 Bourguignon (1999) shows that crime is especially high in some developing economies. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) report that more than 70 percent of firms and public officials stated that organized crime was "highly influential" on state affairs in Peru. Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003) report that firms in developing East Asia view street crime and corruption as the two leading constraints on business.
8 For example the ILO (2005) estimate that there are approximately 12.3 million people who are victims of forced labor.
9 This point is made by Basu (2004) with respect to India and by Keefer (2007) with respect to China. 10 Linking openness and expropriation dates back at least to The Wealth of Nations. See in particular Bk 1, Ch. 9 Par. 15 of Smith (1998) . Dollar and Kraay (2002) emphasize the positive empirical link between growth and poverty and Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) examines the evidence regarding trade liberalization and poverty.
11 For a discussion of the effects of UN trade sanctions in Yugoslavia see Brooks (2002) 
and Andreas
Thus case studies suggest that the effects of liberalization differ across countries. Evidence from the cross-country literature on openness and different forms of expropriation, such as corruption and civil conflicts, is also ambiguous.
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In the absence of a clear empirical relationship between expropriation and international trade it is useful to explore potential theoretical links. In particular trade can affect factor incomes which in turns affects the opportunity costs of crime. It may have an impact on the costs of providing of legal institutions. These arguments suggest that effect of trade liberalization on expropriation will differ across countries depending on a country's factor endowments and the factors used in expropriation. The following model makes these links explicit.
The Model
Consider a small open economy comprising of a unit measure of identical individuals.
The representative individual is endowed withL u units of unskilled labor andL s units of skilled labor, the returns (per unit) to which are denoted by w u and w s respectively.
There are two tradable goods, an exportable and an importable denoted by x and m respectively. Let p x and p m respectively denote the world price of the exportable and importable. Treating exportable good x as the numeráire we normalize p x = 1. Choosing units appropriately for the importable good m we also set p m = 1. We assume that the import-competing sector is tariff protected and let p ( > 1) denote the tariff-inclusive price of the importable good faced by domestic consumers. 
where v(p) is decreasing in p.
Both x and m are produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition using skilled and unskilled labor. Perfect competition in both these sectors imply that unit cost equals price:
where c x (w u , w s ) and c m (w u , w s ) denote the unit cost functions for x and m respectively.
Definition 1: For any given pair of factor returns (w u , w s ), x is unskilled (skilled) labor 13 An alternative approach would be to consider the two country Heckscher-Ohlin model, where each country has different endowment ratios, and examine the implications of trade liberalization for each country. We think however the small country case is simpler and more transparent. Arguably it is also more relevant. Nevertheless we note that in our model the terms-of-trade are given by exogenous world prices. 
A fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of this income is subject to potential expropriation and hence the actual income from productive activities may be less than ω Let z denote the level of legal services in the economy, which is competitively produced under constant returns to scale using skilled and unskilled labor. This implies
where c z (w u , w s ) and p z respectively denote the unit cost function and the price of z.
Unlike x and m, z is assumed to be non-traded. Naturally, the higher the level of z, the higher the probability that the claim of expropriation is successfully verified in the court.
Let α(z) denote that probability, where α(.) satisfies the following properties:
all finite z, and (iv) ln(1 − α(z)) is strictly concave in z.
Assumptions 1(i) and 1(ii) are standard. Assumption 1(iii) says that there is always a strictly positive probability that verification of expropriation claims is unsuccessful.
To understand Assumption 1(iv), note that, for a given z, the probability of failure to verify/detect expropriation is 1 − α(z). Conditional on failure, the probability that an additional unit of z will be successful in detection/verification is
. The log-concavity of 1 − α(z) implies that the conditional probability is increasing in z. That is,
increases as z increases.
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Expropriation Technology
We assume that, in their attempt to expropriate income, each individual can target only one individual and similarly she can be targeted only by one individual.
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Without loss of generality, assume that individual i attempts to extract income from k and individual j attempts to do the same from individual i.
The probability of successfully expropriating another individual's market income depends on the resources committed to expropriation. The production function for expropriation
, where
is homogenous of degree one, (iii)
The unit cost function associated with this expropriation technology, which captures the minimum income that an agent i has to forego to produce e i = 1, is given by 
is often referred to as the hazard rate. In the contract literature, the hazard rate is usually assumed to be monotone in the underlying variable. See for example, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) . 15 The overlaps -that the same person is are targeted by the same individual -are ruled out by assumption. Allowing for overlaps simply reduce the effectiveness of expropriation which has no important consequence in our model. 
Assumptions 3(i) and 3(ii) are standard. Assumption 3(iii) says that there is strictly positive probability of failure even if all resources are devoted to expropriation.
Income
An individual i's income comes from two sources: productive activities and expropriation.
Consider first the income from expropriation. If i succeeds in targeting k and is not detected/convicted by legal authorities then she earns γω 
Taking these different types of incomes and probabilities into account, individual i's expected overall income turns out to be
part of which is used to meet the cost of legal provision. Assuming that the legal expenditures, p z z, are funded by a uniform per-head tax, individual i's expected income available for consumption of tradables is
Utility maximization
Recall from (1) that indirect utility is linear in income. Then, the expected indirect utility for given levels of appropriation and demand for legal services is Noting that
the first order condition of the maximization problem (i.e.,
The left-hand side of (9) captures the expected income foregone from devoting labor to produce an additional unit of expropriation. The right-hand side of (9) captures the incremental benefits, that is, the expected income from an additional unit of expropriation. In equilibrium these two must be equal. In what follows we focus on symmetric equilibrium where e i = e, ω i = ω for all i. Exploiting symmetry and rearranging (9) we get:
where
is the ratio of maximum potential income to the opportunity unit cost of expropriation. • w u and w s satisfy the pricing equations (2) and (3),
Equilibrium
• e satisfies (10),
• factor market clears:
• and, trade is balanced.
Trade Liberalization and Expropriation
Trade liberalization in our framework is equivalent to a reduction in domestic price of the importables, p.
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To determine the effect of a reduction in p on the level of expropriation, e, first we examine the effect on factor prices. Applying the standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem gives the following result.
Lemma 1: For an economy that exports the unskilled labor intensive good a reduction in p reduces skilled wages and increases unskilled wages. The effects on wages are reversed for an economy that exports the skilled labor intensive good.
Proof: Differentiating (2) and (3) (i ∈ {u, s}, j ∈ {x, m}) denote the cost share of factor i in production of one unit of j. Solving these equations
Multiplying both sides of (4) by To evaluate the implications of changes in factor prices on the level of expropriation, e, we also need to evaluate the effect of commodity price changes on r, i.e., the ratio of maximum income to unit cost of expropriation (see equation 11). 
where λ u ≡ We are now ready to examine the effect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium level of expropriation activities. Proof: Differentiating (10) with respect to r and applying the implicit function theorem
since φ (e) > 0, φ (e) < 0, and r − e > 0. Since de dp ≡ ∂e ∂r dr dp
, it follows that the sign of the effect of trade liberalization on expropriation activities, de dp , depends only on the sign of dr dp
. As shown in Lemma 2, dr dp has the same sign as the skill premium if expropriation activities are relatively intensive in unskilled labor, and has the opposite sign to the skill premium if expropriation activities are relatively intensive in skilled labor. QED 
Endogenous Legal Services
The level of legal services is exogenously given in the model described above. While this might be appropriate for a short run analysis, in the long run, presumably, the demand and supply of these services respond to change to prices and incomes as well. Changes in the demand and costs affects the equilibrium level of legal provision which in turn affects the level of expropriation. Below, Lemma 3 records a comparative statics result for future reference and later in this section, Propositions 2 and 3 examine the effect of trade liberalization on legal services as well as expropriation.
Lemma 3: For any given pair of factor prices (w u , w s ), an exogenous increase in the level of legal services reduces expropriation.
Proof: Differentiating (10), noting that r is constant, and applying the implicit function theorem we have
The sign follows from noting that φ (e) > 0, α (z) > 0 and r − e > 0. QED We consider the following sequence of events. First, the government chooses the level of 20 Note also that if the factors were land and labor, it would be very natural to think of crime as labor intensive. Proposition 1 indicates that a positive terms of trade shock to an agricultural exporting economy might then lead to an increase in crime as land rents rise relative to wages. z to maximize the sum of individual expected utilities, [0, 1] where e(r, z) is the value of e that solves γ(1 − α(z)) (φ(e) + φ (e)(r − e)) = 1.
The government chooses z to maximize
Since p is exogenously given and w u and w s by p, effectively, the government solves the following:
where S(z) satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 4: S(z) is strictly concave in z (i.e., S (z) < 0).
From the first order condition of this minimization problem we have that
which implicitly determines the optimal level of legal services. An increase in the level of legal services lowers expropriation (Lemma 3) which in turn raises overall income in the economy. The increase in overall income due to an additional unit of z is −c e ∂e(r,z) ∂z while the cost is c z (w u , w s ) = p z . Equation (17) captures the fact that at optimal z, these two must be equal. (12) and (13) we getĉ
Recall thatp < 0. For the developing economy θ sx − θ sm < 0 and the result follows from noting that Thus, despite the fact that Lemma 4 unambiguously signs the effect of trade liberalization on the right hand side of (17), the effect of trade on legal service provision is ambiguous.
Moreover since the amount of expropriation depends on the level of legal services it is natural to expect that the effect of trade liberalization on expropriation, with endogenous legal services, will also be ambiguous. Surprisingly, we find that this is not the case. dz dp + ∂ 2 e(r, z) ∂z∂r dr dp
) dp , rearranging which gives dz dp
By Lemmas 2 and 4 respectively we can sign dr dp
is ambiguous since φ (.) could be positive or negative. This in turn implies that the sign of dz dp is ambiguous as well.
Now consider the effect of trade liberalization on expropriation, de dp . We have de dp = ∂e(r, z) ∂r dr dp + ∂e(r, z) ∂z dz dp
Substituting the expression for dz dp from (21) in (23) and rearranging gives de dp = 1
∂ 2 e(r,z) ∂z 2 Θ dr dp
where Θ ≡ > 0. The sign of the term Θ depends on the extent to which the probability of success in court α(z) increases as z increases. In Appendix we prove that log-concavity of 1−α(z) implies that Θ > 0. Given this, the sign of right-hand side of (24) Thus the model points to some potential consequences of rising skill premiums associated with trade liberalization and falling trade costs. It suggests that falling trade costs will increase crime in countries with skilled labour intensive exports, such as the U.S.A., if crime is intensive unskilled labor. Empirically this suggests globalization might increase crime in the U.S.A.. Though crime rates have been falling in the U.S.A., Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004) find that crime rates would have fallen faster had it not been for rising inequality. Moreover some of this increase in inequality can be attributed to international factors.
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Perhaps more importantly however the model suggests that the positive effect of trade on unskilled wages may help reduce both the incentives for expropriation and the costs of legal services in economies that export labor intensive goods.
Log-concavity of 1 − α(z)
The finding, in Proposition 2, that trade liberalization lowers expropriation relies on the assumption that 1 − α(z) is log-concave. The assumption eliminates the possibility that increments in spending on z reduce the conditional probability of conviction. This assumption, which is weaker than standard assumption of concavity, is quite plausible and used extensively in the contract literature. Without log-concavity we can obtain the same result, that is, trade liberalization lowers expropriation if the ratio of aggregate income lost (due to expropriation) to aggregate income earned (i.e.
Private Provision
So far we have assumed that the legal services which detect and verify expropriation claims are publicly provided. What happens if, instead, we assume that each individual i has to purchase z i units of legal services privately once their income is expropriated?
Except for the nature of the provision of the legal services itself (private versus public) there are two differences. First, an individual i does not purchase and hence does not 21 According to Rodrik (1997) , trade accounts for a small but significant fraction (10-20 percent) of the observed rising inequality in the U.S.A. and Pablo, Lederman and Loayza (2002) and Soares (2004) show that inequality is positively related to crime. In a similar vein Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2006) find a significant correlation between immigration, which also increases the skill premium, black wages, black employment rates, and black incarceration rates in the U.S.A.. See Appendix B for details.
Note that, in some of the poorest regions in the world (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) there is an acute lack of social capital so that there is neither government provision nor a private market for legal services. In such situations, according to Collier and Gunning (1999) , communities have turned to traditional types of social organization. Modifying our framework suitably, our analysis can be applied for those situations as well. Substituting p z by c z (w u , w s ) and interpreting z as self-provided defense services the entire analysis in Appendix B goes through. Thus presence of a competitive market is not crucial and we can also interpret the private provision case as a model where security services are produced by the household.
Gains from Trade
Compared to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework ours has two new activities: expropriation and legal services. Reallocation of resources between these activities and the tradables sector can generate additional gains or losses beyond the standard gains. The precise magnitude, in general, depends on factor intensity rankings as well as the size of legal sector and extent of expropriation. However to determine that there are indeed additional gains and not additional losses (and vice versa), we find that under certain circumstances, the factor-intensity ranking of sectors alone is sufficient.
Let V denote the aggregate expected indirect utility. Then,
where z solves (17). To capture the additional gains from trade, first we need to consider a standard Heckscher-Ohlin economy with no expropriation or legal services. Set e = z = 0 in (25). Then, taking logarithms and subsequently differentiating (25) giveŝ
In the presence of expropriation and endogenous legal provision, we have that
where η = The underlying product and factor prices are same in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin economy and the economy with expropriation and legal services. This in turn implies that the factor shares in the unit cost functions of the tradable goods (i.e., θ ij , where i = u, s and j = x, m) are same in the two economies as well. Then, comparing (26) and (27), it follows that the magnitude of additional gains from trade is
which we denote by ∆ hereafter. Recall from Definition 1 that θ sm − θ sx > 0 for a developing economy and θ sm − θ sx < 0 for a developed economy. Hence for a developing economy the denominator of (28) In other cases size of the legal sector and scale of expropriation activities are necessary to sign ∆.
How restrictive is the requirement that η > 0? We find that a sufficient condition for η > 0 to hold is that eφ (e) + φ (e) > 0. Under the standard specification φ(e) = ke σ where k > 0, σ < 1, this condition is satisfied for all e > 0. Also in general this condition is satisfied if e is less than a certain threshold.
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It is worth noting that, even if trade liberalization lowers expropriation, this does not necessarily imply there are additional gains. A reduction in expropriation releases resources for production of tradables which creates additional gains. These gains, however, could be more than offset if the legal sector expands as well with trade liberalization and 24 Note, except for the fact that it is bounded above by unity, the properties of φ(e) are similar to the ones of an utility function. Interpreting φ(e) as the utility function in e and φ (e) as the price, the condition eφ (e) + φ (e) > 0 means that the marginal revenue is positive. For an arbitrary demand function marginal revenue is not positive for all output levels. However the output levels where marginal revenue is negative are not interesting as they never arise in a profit-maximizing equilibrium as long as marginal cost is positive. absorbs more than the resources released in the economy because of lower expropriation.
Observe that if The results show therefore that trade liberalization will have a different impact on expropriation in different countries, depending on their trade patterns. Assuming, for example, that crime is essentially a labour intensive activity, the results show that trade liberalization can increase crime in an economy with skilled labor intensive exports, such as the U.S.A.. Since crime levels tend to be most severe in developing countries, however, an important result from the model is the possibility that trade liberalization can reduce expropriation and amplify the gains from trade. This is shown to be more likely to occur in countries that export labour intensive goods, as is the case in many developing economies.
We have that (i)
< 0, and (ii)
Together (i) and (ii) imply h (z) > 0.
Derivation of (27): Log-differentiating (25) yields:
where S(z) ≡ c e e(r, z) + p z z and z solves (17).
We have that d(w uLu + w sLs ) = (w uLu + w sLs )(λ uŵu + (1 − λ u )ŵ s ). Substitutinĝ (12) and (13) respectively we get 
Totally differentiating S(.) gives dS(.) = (c e ∂e(r,z) ∂z
where η = . Applying assumptions 1(ii) and 3(ii) respectively we have that α > 0 and e > 0. Then, the inequalities in the equations above (determining the sign ofê andẑ) follow from noting that (i) 
